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Abstract—The aviation industry faces a rapidly-emerging need 
for integrating Unmanned Air Systems (UAS) into the national 
airspace (NAS). This trend will present challenging questions 
for the safe operation of UAS in controlled and uncontrolled 
airspaces based on new Communications, Navigation and 
Surveillance (CNS) technologies. For example, can wireless 
communications data links provide the necessary capacity for 
accommodating ever increasing numbers of UAS worldwide? 
Does the communications network provide ample Internet 
Protocol (IP) address space to allow Air Traffic Control (ATC) 
to securely address each UAS? Can navigation and 
surveillance approaches assure safe route planning and safe 
separation of vehicles even in crowded skies? 
Under NASA contract NNA16BD84C, Boeing is developing an 
integrated CNS architecture to enable UAS operations in the 
NAS. Revolutionary and advanced CNS alternatives are 
needed to support UAS operations at all altitudes and in all 
airspaces, including both controlled and uncontrolled. These 
CNS alternatives must be reliable, redundant, always 
available, cyber-secure, and affordable for all types of vehicles 
including small UAS to large transport category aircraft. Our 
approach considers CNS requirements that address the range 
of UAS missions where they will be most beneficial and cost-
effective. 
A cybersecure future UAS CNS architecture is needed to 
support the NASA vision for an Unmanned Air Traffic 
Management (UTM) system in uncontrolled airspace and a 
cooperative operation of manned and unmanned aircraft in the 
controlled global Air Traffic Management (ATM) system. The 
architecture must, therefore, support always-available and 
cyber secure operations. This paper presents UAS CNS 
architecture concepts for large UAS operating in the ATM 
system in controlled airspace. Future companion works will 
consider small UAS operating in the UTM system in 
uncontrolled airspace. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
This study considers new architectural concepts for the safe 
operation of Unmanned Air Systems (UAS) in controlled 
airspace (i.e., airspace categories A/B/C/D/E). The 
significant implication of this prospect is that UAS will 
need to share the same airspace as for manned aviation. This 
will require revolutionary new architectural approaches to 
Communications, Navigation and Surveillance (CNS) to 
ensure that UAS can be integrated safely into worldwide Air 
Traffic Management (ATM) system.   
The tremendous growth of UAS in air traffic is anticipated 
to put a strain on airspace capacity and airport resources. To 
mitigate the growth, a new architecture will be required to 
take advantage of emerging CNS technologies. To 
implement the improvements, the air traffic system requires 
significant upgrades to increase system capacity and flight 
efficiency while continuing to meet flight safety standards. 
The air traffic CNS architecture supporting the growing 
number of UAS platforms in the NAS will require new 
integrated solutions onboard and additional enterprise CNS 
systems functionality. 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20190001285 2019-08-30T10:50:48+00:00Z
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Figure 1 shows a notional CNS architecture to support the 
integration of new technologies onboard each UAS platform 
and the integration of advancements in existing enterprise 
systems.   
Navigation augmentations and surveillance information will 
be integrated with the communications network and data 
link services so that UAS can operate safely in controlled 
airspace in cooperation with manned aviation in the ATM 
system. Data communications will further provide the 
critical infrastructure for command and control (C2), 
situation awareness (SA), navigation and surveillance. 
Therefore, each element is an interdependent component of 
the integrated CNS architecture much in the same way that 
the engine, transmission, chassis, body and wheels are all 
interdependent components of an automobile. In the 
following sections, we discuss the constituent elements of 
the proposed integrated UAS CNS architecture in further 
detail. 
2. COMMUNICATIONS - NETWORKS
Introduction 
Unmanned Aircraft (UAs) operating in controlled airspace 
will come under the same ATM jurisdiction as for manned 
aviation. These UAs will occupy Class A/B/C/D/E airspace 
such that their operations will be in non-segregated airspace 
where manned aircraft also operate. This means that the 
UAS will require a robust and highly-available networked 
communications system for Air Traffic Controllers (ATC) 
and Airline Operations Controllers (AOC) to issue ATM 
directives at any time and with high reliability. 
Where manned aviation differs from UAS operations is that 
the pilot is on the ground and not on board the aircraft. This 
means that there will be a communications profile triad in 
which the ATC/AOC issues directives to the ground pilot, 
while the ground pilot issues Control and Non-Payload 
Communication (CNPC) directives to the UA. For current 
ATM systems in manned aviation, primary communications 
are through analog voice with data link short text messaging 
as a secondary facility. Therefore, ATC/AOC must be able 
to communicate with the ground pilot the same as for 
manned aviation, and the ground pilot must act on the 
ATC/AOC directives by appropriately directing the UA. 
Figure 2 - UA/Pilot/ATC Communications Triad 
This UAS communications paradigm (Figure 2) has 
parallels to the way current-day Department of Defense 
(DoD) operations of UAS are coordinated. Ground pilots in 
the continental United States control UAs operating in 
overseas theaters of operation. The ground pilot’s CNPC 
workstation has a direct uplink connection to the satellite 
system which then has a direct downlink connection to the 
UA, with perhaps one or more relay satellites in the path. 
Furthermore, there must be a separate secured voice and/or 
data coordination channel for mission commanders to direct 
the pilot. 
The ground pilot could be located at any physically-secured 
location worldwide from which secured UA data link 
connections and secured ATM coordination channels are 
available. It is also possible to conceive of scenarios where a 
Figure 1 - Combined UAS CNS Architectural Framework 
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single UA is handed off between multiple ground pilots 
during the course of the flight. 
While current-day ATM communications still rely on voice 
as a primary for both manned and unmanned aviation, the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is actively 
working toward a data communications system known as 
the Aeronautical Telecommunications Network (ATN) with 
Internet Protocol Services (ATN/IPS) [1]. This system is 
planned to support data communications as the primary 
service, with voice as a backup service beginning in the 
2025 and beyond timeframe. In the ICAO vision, a 
worldwide ATM internetworking service based on Internet 
Protocol, version 6 (IPv6) messaging will be made 
available. This system is one and the same as that 
anticipated for future operations of UAS in controlled 
airspace and is the subject for the rest of this section. 
ATN/IPS Overview 
The ATN/IPS internetwork (Figure 3) will be configured as 
an overlay service (shown in gray) layered on top of the 
global public Internet (shown in pink) and/or interconnected 
by dedicated ground domain communications links such as 
high-speed fiber-optics. It will further be complementary to 
the Unmanned Air Traffic Management (UTM) system 
currently under consideration for small UAS operating in 
uncontrolled airspace [2]. The ATN/IPS will be constructed 
using Wide Area Networking (WAN) technologies such as 
Multi-Protocol Label Switching (MPLS-WAN) and 
Software-Defined WAN (SD-WAN). Any paths that utilize 
the underlying Internet as transit must be secured with 
Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) or similar network 
encryption technologies. 
The ATN/IPS itself will be organized as a global enterprise 
network overlay for ATM services in the same manner that 
major multi-national corporations operate global enterprise 
networks to support their businesses. It will, therefore, 
require a strongly secured perimeter through physical, link, 
network and/or transport layer securing technologies. 
Security perimeter infrastructure such as Virtual Private 
Network (VPN) gateways and Subnetwork Border Routers 
(SBRs) connect Data link Service Provider (DSP) 
subnetworks to the ATN/IPS; each of which may provide 
connectivity to large numbers of UAs and other ATN/IPS 
end systems. 
Internally, the ATN/IPS will allow global IPv6 addressing 
within an ATN/IPS Service Prefix (ASP) (for example, 
2001:db8::/32) that is assigned by an Internet assigned 
numbers authority for the exclusive use of the ATN/IPS. 
Each ASP contains many Mobile Network Prefixes (MNPs) 
that are delegated to ATN/IPS clients and only made 
reachable among correspondents that are securely attached 
to the ATN/IPS – open Internet communications to MNP 
addresses must be heavily filtered and/or blocked by 
firewalls. In a fully segregated arrangement, there may be 
no open Internet connections allowed to or from the 
ATN/IPS at all. 
ATN/IPS clients such as UAs act as mobile networks that 
can each be delegated one or more MNP. Each MNP travels 
with the client wherever it goes and provides a constant and 
unchanging IPv6 prefix that the client can use to number its 
internal devices, e.g., as a mobile Internet-of-Things (IoT).  
UAs will normally connect to multiple aviation data links 
(e.g., satellite, terrestrial, cellular, etc.) at the same time. 
Figure 3 - ATN/IPS Internetwork 
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This multilink arrangement affords the best reliability, cost, 
performance and quality of service parameters throughout 
the UA’s various phases of flight. In the ATN/IPS design, 
the multilink capability is also fundamentally tied to the 
concept of multihoming where the UA can be registered 
with multiple service provider networks at the same time. 
This arrangement provides greater reliability since the UA 
will have multiple data links to choose from 
ATN/IPS Internetworking Architecture 
Figure 4 shows the ATN/IPS multilink internetworking 
architecture. The service consists of the ATN/IPS physically 
connected underlay and with the Asymmetric Extended 
Route Optimization (AERO) [3] service as an overlay. The 
AERO overlay is responsible for mobility, multihoming, 
security, traffic engineering and quality-of-service based 
routing. 
Figure 4 – ATN/IPS Internetworking Architecture 
In this architecture, AERO Servers form the boundary of the 
ATN/IPS global enterprise network and all communications 
within the ATN/IPS are carried through encapsulation-based 
tunneling across the underlying internetwork. AERO 
Servers connect AERO Clients to the ATN/IPS (shown here 
as manned and unmanned aircraft) and can forward packets 
to destinations via AERO Relays (shown here in the 
ATN/IPS core). 
Aircraft connect to the ATN/IPS via data links that may be 
terminated in a secured data link service provider network 
or open to the global public Internet. In the former case, data 
link service provider SBRs provide a proxy connectivity 
service to the Clients, while in the latter case the Clients 
maintain their own mobile VPNs. 
From the interior viewpoint of the ATN/IPS global 
enterprise network, all AERO Servers present identical 
Client services, and Clients can associate with one or more 
Servers that are nearby. Each AERO Server provides Client-
directed Quality of Service (QoS) mappings and also 
provides priority and/or weight metrics so that AERO 
Relays can make forwarding decisions. 
From an exterior viewpoint, each subnetwork model has its 
own manner of offering secured services to mobile clients, 
with each model having application for various ATN/IPS 
use cases. For example, large UAs operating over tightly-
managed DSP link types will likely use the closed 
subnetwork model. ATN/IPS correspondents on the open 
Internet will use the non-subnetwork model and connect 
directly to AERO Servers via a mobile VPN. 
In the AERO model, AERO Servers and Relays participate 
in a private Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) instance that 
tracks all of the MNPs currently active in the ATN/IPS 
routing system. AERO Relays maintain a core Autonomous 
System (AS), while AERO Servers form stub ASes. When a 
source AERO Server has a packet to send, it sends the 
packet immediately via a default route to an AERO Relay 
which then forwards it toward the highest-priority target 
AERO Server. The source AERO Server can then initiate a 
route optimization procedure to discover one or more targets 
that it can send subsequent packets to without having to 
continue sending them through the dogleg path via the 
AERO Relays. This route optimization can be deferred until 
the direct path between the source and target AERO Servers 
can be tested so that the risk of black-holing along the path 
is eliminated. 
In the AERO model, route optimization is through control 
message signaling after initial packets are successfully sent 
via the default route. An extremely important consideration, 
however, is whether a route optimized path can be 
considered usable before being tested. Instead of making a 
leap of faith, the source AERO Server tests the route 
optimized path first while data packets are allowed to 
continue to flow through a longer path that is known to 
work. The longer path can be considered more reliable since 
it travels over the same paths where BGP Transmission 
Control Protocol (TCP) session keepalives maintain 
reachability. 
The route-optimized path between the source and target 
AERO Servers can fail at some time after the path was first 
tested. This means that some form of unreachability 
detection is required that can quickly detect the path failure 
with a minimum amount of packet loss. Furthermore, if an 
ATN/IPS end system moves from a first AERO Server to a 
second Server, any peers with a route optimization pointing 
to the first AERO Server will have to be informed that the 
route is no longer valid. If each AERO Server remembers 
the peers to which it previously sent route optimization 
messages, it can proactively send updates to invalidate the 
previous route optimizations. If the source AERO Server 
has not received an update and continues to send packets to 
the target, however, the target can reactively send 
“Destination Unreachable” messages while dropping the 
packets. From a reliability standpoint, therefore, it is very 
important that AERO Servers send proactive updates before 
any data packets arrive that would trigger a reactive 
Destination Unreachable. 
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3. COMMUNICATIONS – DATA LINKS
Current Data links for Controlled Airspace 
Currently, the aeronautical standard bodies are discussing 
two new data links for unmanned aircraft systems. These are 
Aeronautical Mobile Airport Communication System 
(AeroMACS) and L-band digital aeronautical 
communications system, type 1 (LDACS1). These are 
briefly described below along with a next-generation 
satellite system before discussing the ideas for the next 
generation. 
AeroMACS - AeroMACS is the data link technology 
developed by RTCA SC-223 for airport surface 
communications. AeroMACS operates in the Aeronautical 
Mobile (R) Service (AM(R)S) allocation in the C band. 
Specifically, a 55 MHz band (5.095-5.150 GHz) is used and 
divided into eleven 5-MHz channels. Each channel uses 
orthogonal frequency division modulation (OFDM) using 
512 subcarriers with an inter-carrier spacing of 
approximately 10 kHz. 
LDACS1 - LDACS1 is leading proposed alternatives for 
communications during in-flight phase (Mission category 
D2). It uses OFDM in the L band. Since L Band is lower in 
frequency than C band used in AeroMACS, it can reach 
farther distances. It uses 50 subcarriers in a 498 kHz 
frequency band. The sub-carrier spacing of 9.76 kHz in L-
DACS1 is similar to that of WiMAX. For an in-depth 
analysis of L-DACS1, please see our papers [4][5][6]. 
Satellite Systems - Currently Inmarsat and Iridium-Next are 
cornerstones of the long-term plan for data communications 
for manned aircraft and we should expect the same links for 
UAS data comms in controlled airspace. 
Another promising next-generation system is the SpaceX, 
which promises the lowest latency and highest data rate of 
all systems till to date. SpaceX is a collaboration of SpaceX 
corporation and Google. It plans to put 4000 Low-Earth 
Orbit (LEO) satellites by 2020. Using a 650 km orbit and 
inter-satellite links, it plans to offer a latency of 20 ms. With 
50 Gbps per satellite, the total throughput could over 200 
Tbps. Assuming 50 million customers, the throughput per 
customer will be 4 Mbps. This should be ideal for UAS 
communication. 
Enhancements to ATM Data links 
The key metrics for UAS data links are peak data rate, per 
user data rates, and energy efficiency. Figure 5 shows the 
desired enhancements in these metrics.  
Most forecasts of UAs in the controlled airspaces are based 
on those of the current manned aircraft and the increase in 
the number of total aircrafts even after ten years is 
forecasted to be less than 5x [7]. This may be an under-
forecast since most of the applications of UAs are not in the 
same area as the manned aircrafts but in applications that 
currently use cars and trucks. 
Given this uncertainty, we believe ideas that improve the 
data link performance by an order magnitude would be 
reasonable. Some of this increase will come from an 
increased spectrum that is being discussed in various 
international standards bodies. The remaining increase will 
have to come from increased spectral efficiency. 
Similarly, assuming a 5-fold increase in UA density, per UA 
data rate will go up by a factor of 2. This is in line with 
RTCA forecasts of data rate requirements for UA data links 
[8]. 
The next generation of ATM data links can benefit from 
some of the new Radio Multiplexing techniques that are 
being developed for the next generation of data 
communications.  
Figure 5 - Goals for Next Generation ATM Data Links 
New Radio Multiplexing Technologies 
Both LDACS-1 and AeroMACS use OFDM. Almost all 
wireless technologies developed in 2000-2010 use OFDM. 
OFDM is now known to have several problems [9] that 
newer proposals are aiming to solve. The problems with 
OFDM are: 
1. Spectrum Overflow: In order to guarantee
orthogonality, each subcarrier should have a zero
power at the neighboring subcarriers. This results
in a power ripple and there is a significant
spectrum overflow beyond the spectrum used by
the subcarriers. This is overcome in OFDM by
having a guard band.
2. Same Subcarrier Spacing: OFDM requires that
all subcarriers be equally spaced. To avoid a noisy
frequency, an integral number of subcarriers need
to be either not used or used at a low rate
modulation.
3. Same Symbol Size: All subcarriers need to use the
same symbol size and cyclic prefix.
Peak data rate
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data rate
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Spectral Efficiency
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4. Time Synchronization: In OFDMA, all users
should time synchronize in the uplink otherwise
they will interfere with each other.
Newer technologies that overcome these problems are now 
being proposed. Two of these techniques are discussed in 
this section. 
Spectrum Filtered OFDM (f-OFDM) - In f-OFDM, the 
frequency band is divided into multiple sub-bands and each 
sub-band may use different OFDM parameters (frequency 
spacing, cyclic prefix, symbol size) optimized for the 
applications. This is shown in Figure 6. 
Figure 6 - Spectrum Filtered OFDM 
For example, the next generation of AeroMACS 
(henceforth, called AeroMACS2) could use this technique 
to allow it to be used for ground applications and some part 
of taxi and takeoff where higher speed would require a 
different set of OFDM parameters. It could also be used to 
cover different areas of an airport differently. Aircrafts far 
away from the base station would use not only different rate 
modulation, but an entirely new set of OFDM parameters. 
In f-OFDM, each sub-band is filtered to avoid inter-sub-
band interference. Hence the name “Spectrum-filtered 
OFDM.” Note that users of different sub-bands do not need 
to be time synchronized. 
This technique can also be used with LDACS1 since it also 
uses OFDM. Again, different sub-bands will allow an 
optimized group of OFDM sub-bands for UAs at different 
distances from the base station or different speeds. 
Figure 7 - Filtered Bank Multicarrier (FBMC) 
Filtered Bank Multicarrier (FBMC) 
In this technique, a filter is used to remove the subcarrier 
overflow as shown by the thicker line in Figure 7. Since 
there are no side lobes, no cyclic prefix is needed and this 
allows more bits per Hertz. Again, this can be combined 
with multiple sub-bands as discussed above and different 
aircrafts can use different sub-bands with different OFDM 
parameters. 
4. NAVIGATION
Regardless of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) size and 
mission, all UASs share the need for navigation accuracy 
supporting guidance and control within a given airspace 
(e.g., Class A – G). Navigation accuracy serves as an input 
reference for non-cooperative surveillance by fusing 
multiple sensor sources to support detect and avoid 
capabilities. Plus, the navigation accuracy supports 
cooperative reporting of own-platform position, course, and 
speed. 
Ground-controlled and autonomous operations of UASs 
require continuous and accurate measurements of the 
vehicle’s position, velocity, attitude (orientation), and 
timing. Existing UAS’s ground station controllers rely on 
GPS for determining position and velocity, plus determine 
attitude using a GPS aided Inertial Navigation Systems 
(INS) with the use of an IMU (Inertial Measurement Unit). 
This means that existing ground station controllers will have 
difficulty navigating, guiding, and controlling UASs when 
GPS is unavailable or degraded [10]. 
This section of the report is focused on navigation 
architectural concepts for UAS within controlled airspace. 
The discussion of navigation architecture concepts will 
factor in identified requirements which are listed in Table 1: 
Table 1 - Navigation Requirements 
Navigation 
Requirements 
Description 
NV1: GPS 
Augmentation 
To deal with GPS-denied 
condition, an alternate navigation 
system to augment GPS is 
needed. 
NV2: Certifiable 
Navigation 
Computing 
Architecture 
Cost affordable certifiable UAS 
safety of flight computing 
architecture to support navigation 
algorithms on any size UAS 
operating within NAS. 
NV3: Navigation 
Source Error 
Detection and 
Correction 
Real-time error detection and 
dynamic switching between 
navigation sources to maintain 
continuous position accuracy. 
NV4: Ground 
Controlled UAS 
Navigation Accuracy 
UAS flight profiles and system 
performance characteristics 
defined to properly control UAS 
via ground station.  
NV5: Universal 
Navigation Message 
Schema 
Message types need to be defined 
within STANAG 4586 to support 
the exchange of navigation 
information within NAS. 
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NV6: BLOS 
Navigation Accuracy 
To compensate for increase 
latency in command and control 
of UAS in BLOS operations, 
assured navigation accuracy is 
required to allow for increased 
autonomous functions.  
NV7: Autonomous 
Landing Navigation 
Accuracy 
Autonomous UAS landing on a 
stationary landing pads or 
runways will require UAS sensor 
capabilities to augment the 
human similar to manned aircraft 
during required visual phases of 
landing. 
Onboard UAS Architectural Framework 
The onboard UAS architecture concept is approached with 
the consideration that “no one stand-alone technology” is 
envisioned to augment GPS for all customers and all 
operational conditions. Therefore, the Boeing team is 
recommending an architectural framework which can 
evolve and support a wide range of alternative navigation 
sources to address the requirement “NV1: GPS 
Augmentation”. Figure 8 shows a recommended navigation 
architecture framework to exploit navigation technologies 
and techniques for augmenting GPS: 
IMA Partitioning 
Boeing recommends utilizing Integrated Modular Avionics 
(IMA) techniques supporting onboard navigation integration 
to reduce cost, weight, space, and power consumption. This 
architectural concept would be useful for all airborne 
platforms to move away from the traditional integration 
with line replaceable units (LRU) to software partitions 
within a consolidated hardware package, such as System on 
Chip (SoC). 
This architectural consideration is supportive of modular 
open architecture for ease of integration of a vast number of 
sensors either dedicated to navigation or leveraged from 
surveillance and/or communications sources. ARINC 653 
can support mix criticality of applications from non-
essential to flight safety critical within the same computing 
hardware which addresses the requirement NV2: Certifiable 
Navigation Computing Architecture.”   
 Integration Perspectives 
GPS signals alone are extremely weak due to high 
frequency and useless in certain environments, such as low 
urban and deep canyon operations. To address requirement 
“NV3: Navigation Source Error Detection and Correction” 
during GPS-denied or degraded conditions, the use of both 
recommended architectural framework and the IMA 
computing based on ARINC 653 can provide a means of 
real-time navigation error detection and correction. Within 
ARINC 653 there are a set of Health Monitoring features 
which can be utilized to detect an error with either the GPS 
hardware or quality of the measurement. The correction 
would then be handled by the ARINC 653 configuration 
table which would be defined dependent on the type of 
errors expected and types of navigation source alternatives 
available. 
The recommended architectural framework and the IMA 
computing based on ARINC 653 is supportive of all flight 
phases of an UAS. For example, navigation algorithms can 
be developed within separate partitions supporting “NV4: 
Ground Controlled UAS Navigation Accuracy” and “NV6: 
BLOS Navigation Accuracy” requirements for different 
flight phases accommodating the vast number of UAS 
Inertial Nav System
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Clock
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GNSS GBAS ILS
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Ranging
SOP
RF Based Nav
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Figure 8- UAS Navigation Architectural Framework 
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maneuverability (e.g., speed, rate of turns, climb, descent, 
etc.) profiles and the varying closed loop command and 
control time for Line of Sight (LOS) and Beyond Line of 
Sight (BLOS) communications. 
For autonomous landing, “NV7: Autonomous Landing 
Navigation Accuracy” requirement, the recommended 
architectural framework and the IMA computing based on 
ARINC 653 are supportive of tightly coupled navigation 
algorithms with flight control algorithms. This technical 
approach would be very similar to fielded auto-pilot systems 
on manned platforms.  
As a means to integrate within ATM, the UAS onboard 
architectural framework is envisioned to communicate using 
an industry approach message schema supporting “NV5: 
Universal Navigation Message Schema.” The recommended 
schema is based on STANAG 4586 to exchange navigation 
information between the UAS and respective ground station. 
UAS Navigation Architecture Summary 
In summary, the onboard UAS navigation architecture 
concept is approached leveraging multiple sources with a 
minimalistic addition of equipage with the consideration 
that “no one stand-alone technology” will augment GPS in 
all flight phases in Class A – E airspace. The proposed 
architecture is envisioned to host functions beyond 
navigation, such as surveillance, communications, vehicle 
management, flight controls, maintenance, etc., with the use 
of the IMA computing architecture based on ARINC 653. 
The UAS navigation architecture concept is also envisioned 
supporting navigation functions by leveraging sensors for 
non-cooperative detect and avoid capabilities and signal 
characteristics from onboard communications systems. 
5. SURVEILLANCE
Introduction 
Controlled airspace is defined by a set of requirements in 
terms of altitude, proximity to airports, ATC clearances, 
avionics, instrumental flight rules, and visual flight rules 
[11]. An efficient UAS ATM system requires cooperative 
surveillance systems. In particular, dependent cooperative 
surveillance systems provide significant benefits including 
high precision independent of target distance, transmission 
of additional data such as velocity [12]. UAs must 
implement methods to autonomously determine their own 
positions. 
This section of the presents ADS-IP system, a proposal of 
cooperative surveillance system able to cope with the 
upcoming paradigm of UAS air traffic and to overcome the 
limitations of current surveillance systems for controlled 
airspace.  
The need of UAs of being connected 
Although it is possible to carry on completely autonomous 
UAs missions, from a safety perspective, it is imperative to 
implement such communication means. There shall always 
be a pilot responsible for the flight who, in case of 
emergency or under any other circumstances, can remotely 
take control of the vehicle. An RF-based communication 
channel is usually used for this purpose. 
Apart from that, it is considered necessary a more accessible 
media to enable the monitoring of the UA and to enable 
potential interventions over it. The kind of data links 
required for these kind of services can be established 
through Internet connections. 
Why ADS-IP 
Traditional surveillance systems are already close to 
saturation. Current surveillance systems based on RF 
transmissions will not be able to cope with the upcoming 
UAS paradigm. 
Alternative surveillance systems, such as ADS-IP (Figure 
9), shall be developed to overcome most of the drawbacks 
of current surveillance systems (saturation, propagation, 
security). 
Figure 9 - ADS-IP Surveillance System 
The use of a system like ADS-IP expands the capabilities 
and features of traditional surveillance systems. ADS-IP 
provides a series of additional services. 
ADS-IP functional description 
ADS-IP is a centralized, automated, and cooperative 
surveillance system. ADS-IP uses IP transmission channels 
to manage the data interchange between UAs and a server 
on the ground, and between such server and other actors 
such as an automatic traffic supervisor or the fleet owner. A 
server on ground acts as the core of the system, gathering all 
the navigation data transmitted by the UAs and distributing 
it accordingly to the needs of each actor. 
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The range of the system is established by artificial means. 
For each UA an area of interest is established. Areas of 
interest are customizable in shape and size. Each UA 
receives surveillance data from the air traffic within its area 
of interest.  
Each ADS-IP equipped UAS, through IP channels, sends its 
surveillance data to a server on ground asynchronously and 
with a determined rate. Surveillance data include the aircraft 
ID, its location and other parameters such as air speed or 
intent. 
Figure 10 - ADS-IP Server Gathering Surveillance 
Information from UAs 
The ADS-IP server is in charge of gathering and storing the 
information received from all the UAs (Figure 10). The 
server analyzes, processes the information received, and 
determines what information shall be relayed to each UA.  
The ADS-IP server is in charge of distributing the 
surveillance data not only to the flying UAs (Figure 11) but 
also to other entities that also need the information for their 
operations (e.g., ATC, fleet owner). 
Geo-segmentation 
Each ADS-IP server has its own area of service (Figure 12). 
ADS-IP servers (AS) receive surveillance data from UAs 
flying within their area of service. These areas are 
customizable for each AS, in order to cover its area of 
service. To provide decentralization, multiple AS need to be 
deployed. 
Figure 11 - ADS-IP Server Distributing Surveillance 
Information to UAs 
Figure 12- Areas of Interest 
With decentralization, some issues arise. UAs need to know 
to which AS shall establish the connection in order to start 
sending and receiving surveillance data. To solve it, ADS-IP 
architecture deploys a series of ADS-IP Directory Servers 
(DS) hierarchically and geographically organized. They 
provide the information of what is the AS to be used 
depending on the position and other parameters (e.g., 
heading, speed, etc.). Each DS has a database of ADS-IP 
Servers and their service areas (Figure 13). DS receive 
queries from UAs and they return a list of AS sorted 
following a criterion to determine which is the most 
convenient AS for each UAS for a determined situation.  
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Figure 13 - ADS-IP Directory Service 
ADS-IP servers are registered into a specific DS (primary). 
Each primary DS replicates the information within its 
database over one (or more) secondary DS in order to 
enhance the reliability of the ADS-IP system. 
UAs are able to query any DS. Queries over DS are 
forwarded to the correspondent DS if the location of the UA 
belongs to a different DS service area.  
The descriptive process of the overall performance of ADS-
IP is as follows: 
1. An UA autonomously determines its location.
2. It queries to a DS for a list of ADS-IP servers
within its area.
3. The DS determines a list of usable ADS-IP servers
and provides the UA with it.
4. The UA then establishes a connection with one of
the ADS-IP servers of the list.
Other issues related with the geo-segmentation of ADS-IP 
are: 
 Handovers: To deal with handovers, AS sends an
alert to the UAS when it is close to the boundary of
its area of service. The UAS queries a DS again.
 Overlapping areas: It is necessary to establish
coordination mechanisms between overlapping AS.
Services that can be delivered by ADS-IP 
This section presents a series of services that can be 
provided by ADS-IP: 
 Surveillance data gathering and broadcast: This
is the main function of the ADS-IP system.
 Tracking services: ADS-IP servers deploy data
persistence capabilities which enables ADS-IP to
provide non-real time data tracking services and
analytics to operators, authorities…
 Dynamic exclusive/inclusive fly zones: Through
ADS-IP it is possible to create exclusive and
inclusive fly zones.
 Cooperative anti-collision systems: ADS-IP
analyzes the tracking of the UAs in real time and
predicts the future location of UAs, so by this mean
it is also possible to predict safety issues.
ADS-IP Security 
This section presents how ADS-IP overcomes the main 
vulnerabilities of ADS-B [13] and as shown in Table 2. 
Table 2 - Threats Addressed by ADS-IP 
ADS-IP relies on secure transmission channels. The 
communications infrastructure establishes a series of 
encrypted VPNs. Thus, eavesdropping will not be feasible. 
ADS-IP does not use the 1090MHz frequency band. As the 
integral architecture proposed relies on the establishment of 
communication channels through different data links, the 
risk of a denial of service based on jamming is decreased.  
ADS-IP implements authentication mechanisms to avoid 
fraudulent injection of messages.  
ADS-IP uses acknowledge mechanisms and encryption 
techniques to sign the messages; these measures reduce the 
risk of successful message injection and message deletion 
attacks. 
Modes of operation of ADS-IP 
ADS-IP implements two different modes of operation, 
authenticated and non-authenticated. 
An authenticated mode is implemented in order to verify the 
identity of the UAs. To operate in this mode, each UA shall 
be registered following the procedures established by 
regulations. In order to facilitate the registration procedure, 
an auto-provisioning system may be implemented. This 
mode of operation reinforces the confidentiality, integrity, 
authenticity, and non-repudiation dimensions of the ADS-IP 
system. On the other hand, an authenticated system presents 
some issues. The process of registration might be seen as an 
entry barrier by the users of the system. It will be necessary 
to define new roles and responsibilities to maintain the 
authentication system. Therefore, there shall be developed 
and implemented systems to solve the problem of 
authenticating UAs over different ADS-IP systems of 
different service areas or jurisdictions.  
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An open mode of operation is also possible. In this mode of 
operation, both ADS-IP servers and Directory servers are 
publicly available and provide surveillance services without 
requesting any credentials to the UAs. At first glance, this 
mode of operation can be seen as an insecure system. The 
system might be vulnerable to spoofing and DoS attacks. 
However, there are several countermeasures that can be 
applied to minimize these risks. On the other hand, a 
surveillance system working in an open mode presents some 
interesting benefits. The main one is that a higher number of 
UAs might be monitored, raising the safety level of the air 
traffic. With this mode of operation, the problems related to 
the management of the credentials disappear, reducing the 
costs of maintenance and increasing the compatibility 
between ADS-IP servers of different owners. 
ADS-IP pros and drawbacks 
ADS-IP Pros - This section of the document highlights a 
series of features of ADS-IP which improve the current 
capabilities of current existing surveillance systems in 
controlled airspaces.  
 Global Tracking. One of the main problems of
current surveillance systems is the lack of coverage
outside the operational areas of radar, ADS-B or
multilateration.
 Security. ADS-B vulnerabilities are well known as
they have been proved and presented in various
papers available on the public media [14].
 Integration of UAS in the airspace. The UAS
industry is growing and it is expected that UAs will
be sharing airspace with commercial air traffic.
Surveillance technologies are needed for a safe
integration of UAs in the airspace without reducing
existing capacity.
ADS-IP Drawbacks - This section presents the identified 
limitations of ADS-IP. 
 Integration with current surveillance systems:
When deploying ADS-IP within controlled
airspace, it will be necessary to invest an important
amount of effort in the integration of ADS-IP with
current surveillance systems used by the ATCs to
manage the air traffic.
Cooperative surveillance systems limitations 
ADS-IP share some limitations with the rest of cooperative 
surveillance systems. There is still a need to develop 
surveillance systems to detect, identify, and cope with non-
compliant systems (non-intentional and intentional). 
6. SUMMARY
In this document, we propose revolutionary new 
architectural concepts for Communications, Navigation and 
Surveillance (CNS) of UAS in controlled airspace. The 
ideas have implications for standards organization activities 
such as in the IEEE, IETF, ICAO and RTCA, and further 
build on designs that have been under development in 
internal R&D efforts in the authors’ organizations. We 
believe that these concepts can help open new opportunities 
for the safe operation of UAS in controlled airspace in 
cooperation with the Air Traffic Management systems both 
within the United States and world-wide. 
We see the emergence of a worldwide ATN/IPS service 
with networks and data links that can support data 
communications for UAS ATM as a key enabler to allow 
safe integration of UAS in non-segregated airspace. We 
further believe the new concepts in navigation and 
surveillance presented here will be instrumental in 
maintaining safe operations in cooperation with manned 
aviation. 
The next phase of our investigation will explore new UAS 
CNS architectural concepts for the operation of small UAS 
(sUAS) in uncontrolled airspace. These concepts will be in 
keeping with the UTM Concept of Operations articulated by 
NASA [2] and that is being embraced by the worldwide 
UAS community. One of the first questions to be answered 
is whether the UTM system will be separate from the 
system proposed here for controlled airspace, or will it all be 
a single system for both. 
Clearly, ATC/AOC workload must be a primary 
consideration given that there will be millions of UAS 
operating in uncontrolled airspace in the coming years. The 
key, therefore, is to again allow the requirements to shape 
the architectural solutions we will propose. We believe that 
the same concepts developed here for UAS operation in 
controlled airspace can be adapted for operation of sUAS in 
uncontrolled airspace with the key differences in scale (i.e., 
the numbers of sUAS in operation) as well as vehicle size 
weight and power. 
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